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DELAWARE CY PRES
CY PRES COMES TO DELAWARE*
Until the case of Delaware Trust Company v. Graham,'
decided in September 1948, the courts of Delaware had
refused to recognize the doctrine of cy pres although it
was widely applied in the United States.' Cy pres, a term
derived from the Norman-French expression "cy pres
comme possible" which means "as near as possible",3 is
the mechanism utilized by the equity courts to save a
charitable trust, when the particular charitable purpose
of the settlor cannot be carried out, by applying the gift
as near as possible to the donor's general charitable inten-
tion.
In America, the reluctant acceptance and retarded de-
velopment of the cy pres doctrine, in some of the states,
was largely due to the failure of the early courts to distin-
guish between judicial and prerogative cy pres.
Prerogative versus Judicial Cy Pres
Cy pres as administered in England was of two kinds;
judicial and prerogative. Not much is known about the
common law origins of cy pres but it is believed that the
judicial power was first exercised by the chancellor under
his jurisdiction as an equity judge while the prerogative
cy pres is supposed to have originated from the power of
the king to insure justice to all of his subjects.' In time
the prerogative power was delegated to the king's council
and was finally taken over by the chancellor as the keeper
of the king's conscience.6 Thus the chancellor acted in a
dual capacity, one judicial and the other ministerial.7 Al-
though it is not known exactly where the line was drawn
between prerogative and judicial cy pres there was a
tendency to increase the judicial power at the expense of
the prerogative until the chancery had encompassed most
* This Comment was written by E. L. Fisch, Esq., LL.B. Columbia Uni-
versity, of the New York Bar. On this occasion the REVIEW has gladly devi-
ated from its usual policy of emphasizing Maryland problems, because the
Comment involves the law of a neighboring State, which has no legal journal
of its own. For the history of the cy pres doctrine in Maryland see Howard,
Charitable Tru8t8 in Maryland (1937) 1 Md. L. Rev. 105; and the later
statute, Md. Code Supp. (1947) Art. 16, See. 279 A.
I Delaware Trust Co. v. Graham, 61 A. (2d) 110 (Del. 1948).
12 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) Sec. 433.
82 Ibid, Sec. 431.
'RESTATEMENT, TRusTs, Sec. 399 (1935).
52 PEaRY, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES (7th ed. 1929), Sec. 718.
Note, A Revaluation of Cy Pres (1939) 49 Yale L. J. 303, 304.
Op. cit. supra n. 5.
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of the prerogative powers over charitable trusts." The
Crown, however, as parens patriae retained the power to
designate a charitable purpose by means of the sign manual
where the object of the gift was illegal or void as contrary
to public policy, and where there was a gift made to charity
generally without the interposition of a trustee.'
An apparent confusion in the cases resulted from the
fact that the chancellor administered both the prerogative
and judicial cy pres and it was not always clear which
branch of the doctrine he was applying or in what capacity
he was acting."° So great was the disorder that Lord
Eldon declared:
"All I can say upon it is, I do not know, what doc-
trine could be laid down, that would not be met by
some authority on this point; whether the proposition
is, that the Crown is to dispose of it, or the Master
by a scheme.""
It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the Delaware
courts went astray on this point. There was a complete
failure to recognize any distinction between judicial and
prerogative cy pres, and it was assumed that the doctrine
was one of prerogative only.
Delaware Interpretation of the Doctrine of Cy Pres
The first important statement dealing with cy pres in
Delaware appears in Doughten v. Vandever,12 a case de-
cided in 1875. The court there held that certain bequests
to charitable institutions were not void for uncertainty or
misdescription and that a court of equity had power to
give effect to charitable bequests by virtue of the common
law. Although the doctrine of cy pres was not involved
the chancellor gratuitously added the statement that the
cy pres doctrine was not recognized in Delaware because
it was a prerogative doctrine and therefore could not be
applied by the equity courts which have only judicial
powers. Obviously the court was unaware that the cy
pres doctrine also existed judicially for it incorrectly ob-
served that:
83 SCOTT, TRUSTS (1939), Sec. 399.1.
9 Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. Jr. 36, 32 Eng. Rep. 15 (1803), affirmed,
13 Ves. Jr. 416, 33 Eng. Rep. 350 (1807). See also 3 ScoTT, TRuSTS (1939),
Sec. 399.1.
10 Note, 8 Corn. Law Quarterly 179, 180 (1923).
1 Moggridge v. Thackwell, upra N. 9; 7 Yes. Jr. 36, 8Z 32 Eng. Rep. 15,
31 (1803).
1Doughten v. Vandever, 5 Del. Ch. 51 (1875).
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"The principle or doctrine of the exercise of this
ministerial function of the English chancellor was
what is known as cy pres; that is to say, where there
was a definite charitable purpose which could not take
place, the court would substitute another, and formerly
of a very different character. It was not, however,
in the exercise of the judicial function of his office,
but in the exercise of his ministerial function, that
the English chancellor applied the fund to a different
purpose from that contemplated by the testator, pro-
vided it was charitable."'13
Unfortunately in Murphy v. McBride,i4 where the Dela-
ware court had before it for the first time a clear-cut case
in which cy pres could be applied, the dictum of Doughten
v. Vandever'5 repudiating the doctrine of cy pres, was
applied. The testator, devised the residue of his property
to the Sisters of Charity of St. Peter's School to be used
"for the support and maintenance of the orphan girls under
its care and charge". The charter of the corporation had
expired three years before the testator's death and an
entirely new corporation was formed some four months
after his death. The court, without reexamining the state-
ments of the Doughten case regarding the nature of cy pres,
refused to allow the new corporation to take the property
on the specific ground that the doctrine of cy pres had
never been adopted in Delaware. 16
Islbid, 64. The court did distinguish between the judicial and preroga-
tive jurisdiction over charities but took the position that the cy pres
power was not judicial.
"Murphy v. McBride, 14 Del. Ch. 457, 130 A. 283 (1925), affirming 14
Del. Ch. 242, 124 A. 798 (1924). But cf. Blackstone v. Chandler, 15 Del.
Ch. 1, 130 A. 34 (1925) where a home for the aged to which a will
directed payment of the principal of the invested proceeds of realty after
the death of the life tenant and, after revival regularly effected a merger
with another such home, the legacy passed to the latter as against the
heirs of the testatrix. The court did not mention the cy pres doctrine
but distinguished this case from Murphy v. McBride on the ground that
in the latter case the corporate beneficiary had ceased to exist before the
testator had died while in this case the corporation was in existence at
the time that the will took effect. The property was held to vest in the
resulting corporation by virtue of section 1974 of the Revised Code of
Delaware (1915). The statute is now section 2092 Rev. Code of Del.
(1935) and provides that the "title to any real estate, whether vested by
deed or otherwise ...vested in any such constituent corporations, should
not revert or be in any way impaired . . ." by a merger, but shall become
the property of the new corporation.
ISupra, n. 13.
"This statement was repeated in U. S. v. 1,010.8 Acres, More or Less,
Situate in Sussex County, 56 F. Supp. 120, 144 (D. C. D. Del. 1944).
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It was not until Chancellor Harrington in the recent
case of Delaware Trust Company v. Graham7 reinvesti-
gated the origins of the cy pres doctrine and came to the
conclusion that "in principle there, therefore seems to be
no good reason why judicial cy pres should not be applied
in appropriate cases by this court" that the misconception
of the earlier court was finally exposed and effectively
demolished. Delaware Trust Company v. Graham involved
a testamentary bequest to a trust company in trust, the
income to be paid to a foreign missionary society of a
designated Methodist church for the purpose of furthering
the objects and purposes of that society. The Foreign
Missionary Society, an unincorporated society, was in ex-
istence at the time of the death of the testator in 1926 and
received the net income from the fund until 1940 when it
ceased to exist as a result of the merger of various church
organizations. The chancellor recognized that the cy pres
rule as used in England was applicable to charitable uses
in both judicial and ministerial cases and adopted the doc-
trine by awarding the income of the fund to a similar
church society to be used for the purposes designated by
the testator.
With this judicial clarification of the law it is hoped
that the Delaware courts will continue to construe the
doctrine liberally so that in the future there will be no
"wrecks of original charities,-charities that were dear to
the hearts of their would-be founders, and the execution
of which would have been of inestimable value to the
public.""8
NOTICE OF TERMINATION REQUIRED TO
TERMINATE A PERIODIC TENANCY
IMPLIED UNDER A VOID LEASE
Darling Shops Delaware Corporation v. Baltimore
Center Corporation'
The plaintiff, the Baltimore Center Corporation, after
giving less than a three-month notice to quit, brought a
summary proceeding to recover possession of the premises
occupied by the defendant under two void or unenforce-
able leases. The predecessor in title of the plaintiff, the
S upra, n. 1. 113.
11 Allen v. Stevens, 161 N. Y. 122, 140, 55 N. E. 568, 572 (1899).
I60 A. (2d) 669 (Md. 1948).
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